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JOB INFORMATION NETWORKS, NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS AND
INEQUALITY
Yannis M. Ioannides and Linda Datcher Loury
The paper explores the theoretical and empirical literature to examine the use by di®erent
social groups of informal sources of information provided by friends, relatives and acquaintances
during job search and its consequences for the job market. It also addresses the role of network
structure and size, the resource endowments of contacts, and nature of the links between contacts
to explain di®erences in the e®ects of job information networks. In doing so, the paper also turns
to the sociology literature on job information networks and provides an economic perspective on
such sociological concepts as strong versus weak ties, inbreeding, distance from structural holes,
etc. The paper distinguishes between models of exogenous job information networks, that is where
individuals obtain job-related information through a given social structure, and endogenous job in-
formation networks, which are social networks that result from individuals' uncoordinated actions.
The paper pays special attention to such issues as physical and social proximity and sharing of
information and discusses them in the context of the recent social interactions and neighborhood
e®ects literature. Finally, the paper outlines a model that integrates job information networks,
where interactions occur in business cycle frequencies, with the dynamics of human capital forma-
tion, which include the joint e®ects of parental, community and neighborhood human capital, and
are set in life cycle frequencies, for the purpose of organizing suggestions for future research and
examining earned income inequality.Contents
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11 Introduction
Recently considerable interest has emerged in the economic literature about social interactions
and the ways in which social norms and structures condition individual behavior. The treatment
of labor market transactions as very di®erent from trading in goods re°ects the importance of
idiosyncrasies due to social e®ects.
One prominent example of where such idiosyncrasies play a prominent role is job market search.
Search theory formally models frictions associated with job seekers' access to information about
availability of jobs of di®erent types and about the conditions of employment [Stigler (1961); Stigler
(1962); Pissarides (2001) ]. Until relatively recently, the job search literature has focused on individ-
uals making decisions on an one-to-one basis. Everyday experience indicates, however, that access
to information is heavily in°uenced by social structure and that individuals use connections with
others, such as friends and social and professional acquaintances, to build and maintain information
networks. Rees (1966) ¯rst drew attention to di®erences among workers in their use of the variety
of available informational outlets. In this context, formal sources of information include state and
private employment agencies, newspaper advertisements, union hiring halls and school and college
placement services. Informal sources include referrals from employees and other employers, direct
inquiries by job seekers and indirect ones through social connections. Since then a burgeoning liter-
ature in economics has developed about the details of social interactions that a®ect the job search
process. This literature complements the more extensive sociological analysis of networks. One of
the objectives of this article is to explore the roles social interactions and social norms play in the
context of this new literature. There is an important richness that the term \networks" connotes
in sociology which to a considerable extent has entered economics as well. A second objective is to
explain its salience within both theoretical and empirical economics research.
Section 2 of this paper attempts to organize what we have learned from the empirical literature
about how individuals go about collecting information for the purpose of ¯nding jobs and how
the outcomes are in°uenced by their social connections. The conventional wisdom that can be
garnered from much of the empirical literature on job information networks and neighborhood
e®ects is organized into a number of broad categories of seven stylized facts. Section 3 starts by
reviewing the sociology literature on job information networks. It then turns in subsections 3.2 {
23.5 to models of exogenous job information networks, ones in which individuals obtain job-related
information through a given social structure and, in subsection 3.6, to the consequences for job
information networks of the recent literature on evolutionary models of information transmission.
Section 4 reviews models of endogenous information networks, ones which result from individuals'
uncoordinated action. It starts in subsection 4.1 with the recent literature on strategic network
formation and then examines, in subsection 4.2, endogenous job information networks. Section
5 sketches the outline of a model that integrates job information networks and the dynamics of
human capital formation and thus provides an overarching theme for the purpose of examining
earned income inequality. Section 6 summarizes suggestions for future research and Section 7
concludes.
2 Stylized Facts about Job Information Networks and Neighbor-
hood E®ects
The ¯rst generation of empirical work on job information networks has established several stylized
facts about such networks. The ¯rst stylized fact is that there is widespread use of friends, relatives,
and other acquaintances to search for jobs and it has increased over time. About 15 percent of
unemployed workers interviewed in the 1970 and 1971 monthly Current Population Surveys used
friends and relatives to search for jobs in the preceding 4 weeks [ Bradshaw (1973) ]. The 1991
and 1992 CPS ¯gures were higher at 23 percent [ Bortnick and Ports (1992) and Ports (1993) ] .
Unemployed and employed workers were equally likely to use friends and relatives during periods
of job search according to Blau (1992) and Blau and Robins (1990). Our own computations using
PSID data for 1993,1 reported in Table 1, Appendix A, show that 15.5 percent of the unemployed
and 8.5 percent of the employed check with friends and relatives. This is in a sense surprising
because economists tend to think of the US economy as being increasingly penetrated by markets,
and yet at the same time reliance on friends suggests persistence of personalized exchange.
The second stylized fact about job information networks is that the use of friends and relatives
1This is the data set as that used by Corcoran et al. (1980). The job search categories are those employed by the
Current Population Survey [ Kuhn and Skuterud (2000) ]. Unlike the European data [see Pellizzari (2003)], they are
not mutually exclusive. Unfortunately, in 1993, relevant questions were not asked of all respondents in the PSID, but
of only those actively engaged in job search, who were either unemployed, (5.8 percent of the sample), or on-the-job
searchers, (8.1 percent of the sample).
3to search for jobs often varies by location and by demographic characteristics. The 1971 Current
Population Surveys,2 analyzed by Bradshaw (1973), showed that unemployed women were less likely
to have checked with friends or relatives to ¯nd jobs in the preceding four weeks (12.5 percent) than
were men (17.4 percent). The same rough di®erence prevailed in 1992, 20.0 percent for women and
26.6 percent for men [ Ports (1993) ]. See also Rosenblum et al. (1999) and Smith (2000). 3 More
educated job seekers were also less likely to use friends and relatives. From Table 1 Appendix A,
20.8 percent of the unemployed job searchers who check with friends and relatives have more than
12 years of schooling and 23.3 percent had at most 8 years. The respective percentages for those
searching on the job are 44.8 and 11.6 percent. Clearly, these particular patterns are unlikely to
be two sides of the same phenomenon. Indeed, di®erent forces may be a®ecting workers with more
schooling.
Di®erences in using informal contacts by age, race and ethnicity show con°icting patterns.
According to Ports (1993), about 18 percent of 16{19 year old job seekers and 22 percent of 20{24
year old checked with friends or relatives, compared to about 26.5 percent of 45{55 year old and
55{64 year old in 1992. On the other hand, others [ Corcoran et al. (1980), Marsden and Campbell
(1990), and Marsden and Hurlbert (1988) ] reported that use of informal contacts declines with age
and/or work experience. Holzer (1987a) found only small racial gaps for younger workers. In his
data, roughly 69 percent of white job seekers ages 16 to 23 used friends and relatives to look for
jobs in the previous year (1982) compared to 67 percent of black male job seekers.4 More generally,
across all age groups, there were small racial di®erences in searching through friends or relatives
(23.9 for whites and 21.5 for blacks in 1992) [ Ports (1993) ]. Hispanics, however, used such methods
more extensively at 32.8 percent.
Methods of job search also vary by location. Elliott (1999) looks at workers with no more than
2Calculations based on data from surveys of individuals are likely to understate the importance of referrals, because
they consider only one side of the job market. In fact, the numbers discussed above are a®ected by adverse selection,
as employers are likely to receive referrals from current employees.
3The gender di®erences may, however, vary according to the type of contact. Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002)
report results on the e®ects of peer and social network on job search using a sample of Dartmouth College seniors.
Individuals who were randomly assigned as roommates when freshmen were asked on how they use social networking
in their job search later on when they reached their senior year. Women were less likely to get fraternity/sorority
help, equally likely to get help from relatives, and more likely to use help from professors.
4As in the case of gender di®erence, racial disparity in using informal sources may depend on the type of contact.
Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002) report that whites were more likely to report that fraternity/sorority members,
relatives, and professors were in°uential in helping them ¯nd a full-time job or career. Racial di®erences are especially
large for the last two categories.
412 years of schooling and ¯nds that those in high poverty neighborhoods were substantially more
likely (88 percent) to use informal job search methods than those from low poverty neighborhoods
(74 percent). More generally, our own counts with the PSID data show that use of informal
contacts increases with the size of the largest city in the county where the household resides. While
40 percent of the respondents live in SMSAs with a largest city with at least 100,000 inhabitants,
65 percent of unemployed job searchers and 45 percent of employed job searchers who used friends
and relatives resided in such areas [Appendix A, Table 2].
The third stylized fact about job information networks is that job search through friends and
relatives is generally productive. Both employed and unemployed who used friends to search for
jobs received more o®ers per contact and accepted more o®ers per contact than did workers who
used other sources of information about job openings [ Blau and Robins (1990) ]. This could
explain ¯rst why about half of all workers heard about their current job through a friend or relative
[ Corcoran et al. (1980) ]. Summarizing the results of 24 studies, Bewley (1999) estimated that the
30 to 60 percent of jobs were found through friends or relatives.
Using friends and family may be productive, not only in ¯nding jobs, but also in improving
the quality of the match between ¯rms and workers. Those who found jobs through personal
contacts were generally less likely to quit [ Datcher (1983) and Devine and Kiefer (1991) ] and
had longer tenure on their jobs [ Simon and Warner (1992) ]. On the other hand, however, the
estimated e®ects of job contacts on wages vary considerably across studies. Using their Dartmouth
College data, Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002) found large positive correlations between getting
help from fraternity/sorority contacts and obtaining prestigious, high-paying jobs. Rosenbaum et
al. (1991) reported that workers with contacts enjoyed a wage advantage that increased with age.
In contrast, other work has found that an initial wage advantage declined over time [ Corcoran et al.
(1980); Staiger (1990); Simon and Warner (1992) ] or found no general initial or persistent earnings
e®ects [Bridges and Willemez (1986), Holzer (1987b), Marsden and Hulbert (1988)]. Completing
the spectrum of results, Loury (2003) and Elliott (1999) showed that at least some types of job
contacts were correlated with lower wages.
The fourth stylized fact about job information networks is that part of the variation in the
productivity of job search by demographic group simply re°ects di®erences in usage. As indicated
5above, women were less likely to use friends and relatives during job search. This could explain
why, according to Corcoran et al. (1980), 52 percent of white men and 47 percent of all women who
were household heads or wives ages 45 and under found out about their current job from a friend or
relative ( see also Smith (2000) ). Hispanic men report more frequent use of friends and relatives for
job search than non-Hispanic whites, and are also signi¯cantly more likely to have found out about
their most recent job through personal contacts [ Smith (2000) ]. Looking at variation of usage as
neighborhood income varies, Elliott (1999) showed that less-well educated workers in high poverty
neighborhoods were more likely to use informal contacts and that these contacts were also the main
avenue by which these individuals found work. About 73 percent of jobs in neighborhoods with
poverty rates of 40 percent of more were found through informal means compared to 52 percent of
jobs in neighborhoods with poverty rates less than 20 percent.
The ¯fth stylized fact is that many di®erences in productivity of job search by age, gender,
race, and ethnic group cannot be completely accounted for by di®erences in usage. Consider
employment e®ects ¯rst. According to Bortnick and Ports (1992), men who were unemployed in
a given month in 1991 and who used informal contacts in that month were slightly more likely
than their female counterparts to have found jobs (24 compared to 21 percent). The di®erences
between blacks and whites who used informal contacts were more substantial: 15 percent of blacks
who were unemployed in a given month in 1991 and who used informal contacts in that month
found jobs, compared to 24 percent of whites. According to Korenman and Turner (1986) [ see also
Rosenblum et al. (1999) ], employed young black inner city men were less likely to have found their
jobs through friends and relatives, even though other analysts report few racial di®erences in the
incidence of use of friends and relatives by job seekers. More speci¯cally, Holzer (1987a) showed
that, in 1981, 25 percent of previously unemployed African-Americans ages 16{23 compared to 32
percent for similar whites obtained jobs through friends and relatives. Most of this discrepancy
was due to di®erences in the likelihood of receiving o®ers from jobs heard about through friends
and relatives. In fact, almost one-¯fth of the total di®erence in probability of gaining employment
between black and white youth resulted from racial di®erences in this probability [ see also Smith
(2000) ].
In addition to variation in the relationship between informal contacts and employment across
6groups, there are many demographic di®erences in the e®ects on wages of job search through
contacts. Korenman and Turner (1996) reported that, among young workers in inner-city Boston,
whites who found jobs through contacts received much larger wage gains, 19 percent higher, than
blacks with similar characteristics. Smith (2000) showed that gender wage di®erences were small
for those using formal job search methods. In contrast, she found larger wage di®erences between
Hispanics and whites who used personal contacts to ¯nd jobs compared to those who used more
formal means. Korenman and Turner (1996) replicated the results on Hispanics for a nationally
representative sample of urban youth. Elliott (1999) reported that for less well educated workers,
the use of informal contacts results in signi¯cantly lower wages.
The sixth stylized fact is new and needs to be treated as tentative. The Internet is being used
increasingly for the purpose of job search, at least according to anecdotal evidence. This area is little
explored because data are only just starting to become available. According to Kuhn and Skuterud
(2000), who use data from a special supplement to the December 1998 Current Population Survey,
which asked respondents about computer and Internet use, 13 percent of unemployed Americans
and 7 percent of employed Americans looked for a new job via the Internet. However, there appears
to be a \digital divide" for the unemployed: only 7 percent of unemployed Hispanic job seekers
looked for jobs online in December 1998, compared with 9 percent of blacks and more than 16
percent of whites. For those employed, the respective ¯gures are 4, 6 and 7 percent. The gender
divide is not nearly as stark. Unemployed women used the Internet for job search at the same
rate as men. Among employed women, 6.7 percent looked for jobs on the Internet in December as
opposed to 7.6 percent of employed men. However, comparison of the trends in use of traditional
methods of job search [ ibid., Table 8, p. 10 ] suggests that use of public employment agencies has
declined from 1994 to 1999 although it is overrepresented among Internet job seekers in December
1998 [ op. cit., Table 7, p. 9 ]. While we will not be able to pursue this angle further in the
remainder of the paper we do underscore that models of job search will need to accommodate this
new technology. In fact, we will argue in section 6 that this is an important issue for future research.
The seventh stylized fact is also new but arguably more robust than the sixth. There appear
to be important di®erences across countries in the use of personal contacts by both ¯rms and
workers. Pellizzari (2003) explores the empirical evidence for the countries of the European Union
7as of 2003 (with the exception of Sweden5) using the European Community Household Panel and
compares with the US using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). He ¯nds large
cross-country and cross-industry variation in the wage di®erentials between jobs found through
formal and informal methods. Across countries and industries, premiums and penalties are equally
frequent. Pellizzari attributes these di®erences to di®erent recruitment strategies by ¯rms. How-
ever, such di®erences could be attributable to both di®erent institutional and social practices which
may compound the impact of di®erences in industrial compositions of economies.
Taken together, these stylized facts imply that the role of information networks in the job search
process is not straightforward. Neither is it always clear a priori why some groups rely more on
informal methods than others, nor why the pattern of employment and earnings payo®s to networks
varies across groups. Moreover, recent research indicates that these stylized facts do not exhaust
the range of e®ects of job search networks. For example, what e®ects do contacts have on wage
and employment inequality, the duration of unemployment, and labor market withdrawal?
More generally, a common problem underlies much of the stylized facts in the literature on job
contact use and the correlation of job contacts with labor market outcomes. It often (though not
always) fails to be well-grounded in economic or other theory about how networks form or under
what circumstances networks are likely to have their largest e®ects. In ¯lling this vacuum, much
of the more recent detailed research into job networks (discussed below) points to four important
considerations | employer, relational, contact, and worker heterogeneity. Employer characteristics
determine the context in which job search methods operate. For some employers, desired applicant
characteristics may be easily discernible, while for other employers recommendations from trusted
sources may provide better information. Contact and relational heterogeneity respectively denote
variations in the resource endowments of one's associates and the social relationships that allow
individuals to claim access to resources possessed by their associates. Worker heterogeneity refers
to di®erences in worker productivity or other characteristics. It interacts with all three of the other
areas in determining access to contacts and employers.
Without the appropriate theoretical grounding that pinpoints the role of these four consider-
ations, it is di±cult, for example, to interpret demographic variation in contacts use. Does lower
5The exception of Sweden is unfortunate because including it might have provided an important benchmark: all
job openings are centrally registered in Sweden.
8contact use by women constitute a problem of access to the best job opportunities, or does it
re°ect di®erences in the ease of observing the types of skills with which many women enter the
labor market? Does higher contact use by Hispanics than blacks signal high quality contacts and,
therefore, greater returns to informal compared to formal methods for Hispanics? On the other
hand, does it imply an absence of job information alternatives for Hispanics who are forced to rely
on informal sources as, in some cases, the only means of ¯nding jobs? Interpreting di®erences in
e®ects of contacts on labor market outcomes generates similar ambiguity. Is the larger positive cor-
relation between wages and using contacts for whites compared to blacks reported by some analysts
spurious? That is, do white workers earn more with or without using contacts due to higher levels
of unobserved productivity? Does the correlation arise simply because contacts are more likely to
pass on job information to such workers? Alternatively, do whites gain more from contacts than
blacks because their contacts have access to more information about better quality jobs? As the
remainder of this article indicates, all four of these elements | employer, relational, contact, and
worker heterogeneity | are critical to understanding this myriad of commonly observed ¯ndings
as well as to extending the role of job networks to account for other labor market outcomes.
3 Job Information Networks
One of the objectives of this essay is to actually identify and explore mutual in°uences and patterns
of interplay between the literatures on social networks in economics and sociology, with particular
emphasis on social networks that have consequences for the job market. In sociology, the concept
of a network and use of network models is standard [ Burt (1980) ]. Usage of the term networks
is perhaps as ubiquitous as that of markets in economics and is used in a comparably broad range
of contexts. In economics, one the other hand, network refers to \personalized exchange among
many agents" [ Kortum (2003) ]. The central importance of networks to sociology has forced it
to de¯ne economic networks more precisely as, one, particular patterns in economic exchanges,
two, indications of \primordial" relationships among agents, and, three, \structures of mutual
orientation" [ Zuckerman (2003)]. The third de¯nition encompasses the previous two as special
cases: it allows for social ties that di®er in terms of \type, valence and strength of connection" [
ibid. ]. Networks in sociology are not just an important descriptive device but a tool to explore
9direction of causality and the role of unobserved heterogeneity.
In contrast to the extensive treatment of networks by sociologists, economists' formal as well
as qualitative understanding of the role of networks is much less developed. There has also been
in°uence in the other direction, however, from economics to sociology. In at least one instance
articulation of patterns in interpersonal interactions relevant to economic outcomes by economists
has in°uenced sociological methodology. This is the case with the concept of social capital, which
is particularly relevant in our context. Social capital was originally de¯ned by Loury (1977) as
the set of resources resulting from family relationships and community social organization that
a®ect the cognitive and social development of the young. It has found much fertile ground in
sociology. Coleman (1990), who helped popularize the concept, treats social capital as a form of
social organization created when the structure of relations among persons facilitates action making
possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible [ ibid., p. 300 ].
The term social capital is now used quite commonly to refer to the web of connections individuals
use in daily life and is therefore important to mention here.6 Unlike some economists who use the
terms social capital and social networks almost interchangeably, for reasons of clarity we do not
adopt in the remainder of this essay.
Another instance of interplay between economics and sociology is found in the most recent
economics literature on job information networks and re°ects the in°uence of the empirical ¯ndings
of Granovetter (1974; 1995). Granovetter's empirical ¯ndings in support of the role of weak contacts
are widely cited in both the economics and sociology literature. The second edition of this book
[ Granovetter (1995) ] contains a review of the evidence since the 1974 study. Granovetter argues
that the voluminous evidence that has accumulated since 1974 continues to support his book's
original thesis that social networks are very important in helping people to ¯nd jobs and employers
to ¯nd prospective employees. In particular, local contacts, \weak ties," help women \in women's
occupations" locate jobs, and that \networking is crucial for expanding women's opportunities
in male-dominated occupations" [ ibid., p. 170 ]. He concludes that in spite of \an outpouring
6The notion of social capital has been used extensively to account for a wide variety of outcomes [ Dasgupta
and Serageldin (2000) Putnam (2000), Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000) ]. The two key elements
of social capital include the resource endowments of one's associates and the \social relationship itself that allows
individuals to claim access to resources possessed by their associates" [ Portes (1998); Glaeser et al. (1999; 2000);
Putnam (2000) ]. Additional evidence of the popularity of the concept is given by MÄ obius (2001), who uses the terms
social capital and social networks interchangeably.
10of research," we still know little about the complex network processes by which \inequities are
produced and reproduced."
This paper is focused on job information networks as patterns of exchange of job-related infor-
mation. We look at these patterns either as given (\primordial"), or as the outcome of deliberate
decisions by individuals to help us untangle the complex and seemingly contradictory ¯ndings about
use of job information networks in the labor market context and their e®ects on employment and
wages. The paper shows how network considerations imply di®erent outcomes than the simple
one-to-one search models that typify most economic analyses of job acquisition.
3.1 The Sociology Literature on Job Information Networks
The sociological literature includes a rich array of analysis of the three categories of job network
e®ects | employer, contact, and relational heterogeneity. Much of the initial research to explain the
operation of job networks focused on relational heterogeneity. Granovetter (1974; 1995) argued that
a key characteristic determining the e®ect of job networks on ¯nding employment is the strength
of social tie. Roughly speaking, strong links join close friends and weak links join acquaintances.
Strong links tend to traverse a society \slowly". If you start with an arbitrary person and develop
the network of links to her close friends, and then to the close friends of her close friends and
continue in this manner, then the overall size of the group grows slowly. The close friends of my
friends are likely to be my close friends too. Societies of close knit relations are likely to develop
a large number of closely knit groups. If, on the other hand, we track my acquaintances and their
acquaintances in turn, it is less likely that the acquaintances of my acquaintances are also my own
acquaintances. As sociological research has measured [ Milgram (1967) ] and random graph theory
has demonstrated [ ErdÄ os and Renyi (1960); Palmer (1985); Newman (2003) ] any two individuals
in the United States can be connected by as few as six weak links. So, the overall size of the
group of interconnected individuals will grow faster with weak ties. Dodd, Muhamad and Watts
(2003) show, based on a recent global internet-based social search experiment, that successful social
search is conducted primarily through intermediate to weak strength ties, relies disproportionately
on professional relationships and reaches its destination in a median ¯ve to seven steps, depending
on the actual distance between source and target.
11Granovetter's original work and the 1995 edition of the 1974 study have been read very widely.
Within sociology the notion of tie strength has been incorporated into more general analyses of job
networks and social capital. Yet, Granovetter's work has been much less in°uential in promoting
modelling of job information networks within economics. This is not so surprising: economists
are typically more likely to be interested in why a network forms, whereas sociologists take the
existence of networks as given and study their e®ects. In the ¯rst subsection below, we explore our
understanding of job information networks from the interplay between the sociology and economics
literatures. Then we turn to the economics literature on exogenous job information networks and
on neighborhood e®ects that have consequences for job markets.
The notion of weak versus strong ties is, of course, one of the most important concepts that
have motivated the literature on the e®ects of social contacts on job outcomes. Burt (1992) argues
that, while tie strength is correlated with information bene¯ts, the true causal agent in social
networks is the structural hole. Burt de¯nes a structural hole as the \gap", separation, between
non-redundant contacts. Regardless of tie strength, individuals located at structural holes provide
a bridge for information to °ow between groups that would otherwise not have access to each other.
For example, suppose group A consists of individuals who often contact each other and would be
considered to have strong ties in the Granovetter framework. The same is true for the members of
group B. Group A is linked to group B only through the individual at a structural hole in group
A. This link allows for information to °ow between otherwise inaccessible groups. Note, however,
that the relationship between the group A individual at a structural hole and his non-redundant
contact in group B may be strong or weak. The key factor is not the strength of the tie but that the
individual occupying the structural hole bridges the gap between groups A and B. The structural
holes argument7 implies that, one, a network with more non-redundant contacts can provide more
information than the same size network with redundant contacts; and, two, a network with a given
number of non-redundant contacts provides more information if, in turn, those contacts \reach
separate and therefore more diverse social worlds" [ ibid., p. 21 ].
Burt (2001) also argues that the non-redundant information that structural holes possess is
7As an aside, to economists this argument is akin to an arbitrage-type argument and thus amenable, in principle,
to analytical treatment. A very recent paper by Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2004) applies the strategic network
formation approach to the concept of a structural hole. A noteworthy result here is, as we discuss further below, that
if the cost for forming links is not very small, the unique equilibrium network is a star.
12better communicated to, and acted upon, in networks with closure. He de¯nes closure as \social
capital" that is created by a network of strongly interconnected elements. With high levels of
closure, everyone is cohesively connected to everyone else within the network. Information passed
to a subgroup within the network quickly ¯nds its way to the remainder of the network. When
there is closure, referred workers may have higher job productivity because their reputation within
the network is more contingent on their performance.
Why does closure, whereby agents are e®ectively interconnected in a cyclical fashion [ Coleman
(1990) ], and not just social connectedness play such a key role in sociological thinking? Here is
a guess. Consider a social setting where people tend to imitate one another, as in the spread of a
fashion. When everyone is directly connected with everyone else, di®erent individuals starting fads
are unlikely to have decisive in°uence on each other. Alternatively, consider individuals connected
along a path | where each individual is connected to two others and there are two end agents |
in which case everyone is at least indirectly connected with everyone else. Such an arrangement
confers a modicum of in°uence to the two end agents, whose own actions are in°uenced by one
other agent only. If those two end individuals were to be connected so that the topology of the
social structure becomes a wheel, there is no longer any in°uence to be conferred by the topology of
the social structure as such, and this accomplished with the minimum total number of connections.
In spite its popularity, the sociological concept of closure is to the best of our knowledge not
very rigorously developed. An exception is Lippert and Spagnolo (2004) who provide rigorous
support for the disciplining role of closure in sociology by means of a game-theoretic model of
networks of relational contracts. They examine networks of relations under di®erent informational
regimes, paying special attention to di®erences between circular and non-circular architectures. If
agents cannot discipline themselves within a certain relation and are allowed to have relations with
only two other agents (\neighbors"), a \circular pooling of asymmetries" made possible by a social
network may end up sustaining all the relationships in equilibrium.
There are properties of social structures that have been attributed to closure that may instead
be explained by symmetry in the network that represents social structure, rather than closure.8
8Ioannides (2001) shows that symmetry | technically speaking, all individuals' being connected to the same
number of other individuals | ensures that the maximal eigenvalue of the corresponding graph is equal to the
number of neighbors. Therefore, if individuals' are in°uenced by the average action among those she is connected
with, then the respective dynamical system has an eigenvalue of 1 and an associated eigenvector that consists of 1's,
13For example, this is the case when individuals who act similarly are more likely to connected with
one another than with others who act di®erently. Such patterns of correlation in the behavior of
connected individuals resemble spatial waves and exhibit clustering. Clearly, this is an area where
additional research would be very fruitful.
Other sociological research contends that the role of relational heterogeneity cannot be fully
understood without taking into account the role of social setting or contact heterogeneity. Lin's
(2001)\strength of position" proposition argues that individuals are more likely to associate with
others in similar social and occupational positions; in other words, they sort. This proposition
implies that social networks develop along dimensions such as race, ethnicity, religious a±liation,
and education. The emphasis in Lin's work is on the characteristics of the contacts themselves.
Lin's \social capital" proposition claims that contacts who possess, or have access to, more highly
valued resources improve outcomes for job seekers more than other less well-placed contacts.
Lin, Vaughn, and Ensel (1981) and Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn (1981) report that the family
background, education, and early occupational status of job seekers all in°uence the occupational
status of the contacts they can use. Furthermore, the occupational status of these contacts alters
the prestige that job seekers obtain. In related work, Mencken and Win¯eld (2000) emphasize that
women who found their jobs through informal contacts and who used male contacts were less likely
to work in female-dominated occupations. Echoing Mencken and Win¯eld, Beggs and Hurlbert
(1997) indicate that the gender of the informal contact tie a®ects occupational status. Women whose
contacts are other women work in occupations with lower socioeconomic index scores. Evidence
of correlation between contact characteristics and job contact e®ects is not, however, uniform.
While Marsden and Hurlbert agree with Lin, Vaughn, and Ensel (1981) and with Lin, Ensel, and
Vaughn (1981) with respect to occupational prestige, they conclude that \the net e®ects of the
social resource variables [for other outcomes such as wages] can be summarized simply: there are
none." They conclude that these ¯ndings are consistent with those of Bridges and Villemez (1986),
who ¯nd no e®ects of tie strength on income.
The third branch of sociological research examines the role of employer heterogeneity on contact
e®ects. It points to important di®erences in the use of referrals in di®erent industries, perhaps
which ensures (relative) persistence.
14re°ecting di®erences in corporate culture. The sociology research in this area appears to be ahead
of its counterpart in economics in assessing the consequences of employer heterogeneity. According
to Fernandez and Castilla (2001), employers reap returns from referrals for three reasons. Referrals
provide a large pool of quali¯ed applicants so that less screening is required to ¯ll positions. Referred
applicants have more information about the nonpecuniary aspects of employment and, therefore,
are potentially better matches. Finally, connections between new hires and incumbent employees
can make the job transition smoother as well as create additional loyalties and attachments to the
job. More generally, Marsden and Gorman (2001) argue that information provided to employers
through referrals may reduce employer uncertainty about the prospective worker's productivity.
The e®ects of job contact information are, therefore, likely to be higher in ¯rms and industries
where high quality information about workers' likely performance is important. These include
conditions \when performance and skills are di±cult to observe, when sta±ng strategy is °exible,
when the use of networks is a central component of performance, and when selection errors are
costly (p. 108)." Consistent with this prediction, Marsden and Gorman present evidence that
contacts are more likely to be used when ¯lling managerial, professional, or sale/service positions
and are less likely to be used in the public sector and in establishments that are part of multi-site
¯rms. Complementary work by Elliott (1999) found di®erences in informal contacts by occupation.
General laborers (de¯ned as all nontechnical positions lacking managerial authority, 1990 Census
Occupation Codes 243-902) and those in managerial positions who found their jobs through informal
contacts had signi¯cantly lower wages than those who found their jobs without an active search.
Intra¯rm analyses of job contact e®ects also point to the importance of context. Petersen,
Saporta and Seidel (2000) use data on all 35,229 job applicants to a mid-sized high-technology
organization and ¯nd that all di®erences in job o®ers that are attributed to gender disappear
once age and education are accounted for. Similarly, all e®ects of race disappear once the referral
method is taken into account. That is, when one controls only for age, education, and rating at
¯rst interview, race has a strong impact on the likelihood of having a second interview and on the
increase in the salary o®er. In their data, personal and professional contacts account for 60.4 percent
of applicants and 80.8 of those receiving o®ers, and there is also an e®ect of being contacted by
headhunters. Thus, the apparent and perhaps real meritocracy characterizing the high-technology
15industry raises additional questions on the role of access to job information networks as a force in
persistent inequality.
Using data from a high-technology ¯rm, Podolny and Baron (1997) ¯nd that intra-organizational
mobility is enhanced by having a large network of informal ties that supply access to information
and resources. Yet, availability of a small dense network of social contacts with high closure and
cohesiveness is no less important in helping shape one's organizational identity and career goal
expectations. This highlights the importance of how social network structure and content interact
in determining careers within organizations.
Di®erences between industries and employers may also account for ethnic and race variations
in contact e®ects. Waldinger (1996) shows that, both historically and currently, ethnic groups have
established speci¯c occupational and employment niches that facilitate employment and training
of members of their group and that limit access of outsiders. Ethnic newcomers to New York
found their way to the bottom of the job ladder associated with the niche and then gradually work
their way upward through the specialized economic activities associated with the niche. Early
examples of ethnic niches include Jews in commerce and clothing manufacture and Italians in
laboring jobs in construction and longshoreman work. More recently, occupational niches include
African-Americans in the public sector, West Indians in the hospitals, nursing homes, and health
services, Chinese in restaurants, laundries, the garment trade and small-scale retail trade, and
Dominicans in garments, restaurants, hotels, and a few other light manufacturing and retail trades.
These ethnic group niches have important implications for the usefulness of job contacts and
connections for ethnic group members entering the labor market or changing jobs. Consider, for
example, the large concentration of African-Americans in public service. On the plus side, it reduces
their experience of discrimination and thus raises black earnings relative to whites. Resulting job
contacts and connections may lead to a greater likelihood of job o®ers and to more rapid career
advancement upon accepting the o®ers. On the minus side, the large concentration of African-
Americans in the public sector is mirrored by their declining presence in the private sector and
thus is associated with lower access to contacts, networks, and training opportunities. Moreover,
if the public sector niches held by African-Americans require relatively high levels of skill, job
information about these niches may not be especially useful for low-skilled African-Americans.
163.2 Models of Exogenous Job Information Networks
Models derived from research by economists on exogenous job networks have outlined the speci¯c
implications of social structure in more detail than some of the sociological work described above.
By exogenous, we mean that the network of connections (or, in more mathematical language, the
graph that describes these connections) among individuals is given. Mortensen and Vishwanath
(1994) show that the equilibrium wage distribution increases with the probability that the o®er
is from a contact. Their argument is based on the premise that wages received from jobs found
through contacts re°ect the distribution of wages earned by individuals who are in contact with
one another. This distribution, in turn, stochastically dominates the distribution of wage o®ers
across employers. Like Bridges and Villemez (1986), whose work was referred to earlier above,
Montgomery (1992) examines the link between wages and tie strength and concludes that, while
weak ties increase reservation wages, this does not imply a similar \relationship between wages
and the type of tie actually used to ¯nd a job". Intuitively, weak ties are more likely to generate
o®ers than strong ties. Workers who accept weak tie o®ers are, therefore, likely to have received
fewer total o®ers and be less selective in the jobs that they choose than those who accept strong tie
o®ers. This indicates that the empirical ¯nding of no relationship between tie strength and wages
in the Bridges and Villemez study does not imply that tie strength is irrelevant for determining job
outcomes. Montgomery's work is a notable example of research by an economist that has helped
bridge the gap between economics and sociology in this area.
A number of more general models examine additional detail about the interaction between
contact and relational heterogeneity. They highlight the speci¯c characteristics of relations between
contacts and job seekers that alter contact e®ects. An example of such a model is Montgomery
(1990), who suggests that the main social component is inbreeding social bias. That is, each person
is more likely to have a social tie to a younger person of the same type as herself. Thus, a social tie
implies that a referral possesses informational value. In Montgomery's model, each individual lives
for two periods, making an education decision in the ¯rst period, which is observable, and working
in the second. Individuals may be of two types. Each individual knows at most one person in the
older (and currently employed) generation, possessing a social tie with probability ¿: Conditional
on holding a social tie, a worker knows someone of the same type with probability ®; ® · 1
2: Some
17young persons may have several social ties while others have none. Those who do have social ties
receive o®ers from the employers of their acquaintances, but those who do not are hired through
the formal market. Firms may choose technology which makes either type fully productive, except
that choice along with that of the wage rate must be made before the worker's type is known.
The model is closed by equating the percentage of those educated with the percentage of those
facing education costs who ¯nd it advantageous to acquire information. The possibility of multiple
equilibria depends critically upon the properties of the distribution of education costs across the
population. A key element in Montgomery's theory is the derivation of the probability that an
individual with a referral accepts a job o®er, as a function of the o®er: a(w) = e¡¿n(1¡F(w));
where F(w) is the distribution function of referral wage o®ers and n the steady-state fraction of
educated workers. In this model, a higher probability of a social tie and a higher percentage of
educated workers decrease the probability of acceptance but increases wage dispersion. While the
former is a straightforward supply e®ect, the latter is subtle. Increased inbreeding by a group is
shown to be associated with larger di®erences from other groups. Selection operates over time via
network density parameters and inbreeding. Individuals pass on their advantages to kin and social
acquaintances. These factors work to perpetuate and strengthen inequality over time.
Munshi (2002) studies transmission of job information among Mexican migrants to the US labor
market. He uses a model of referrals similar to Montgomery's and examines changes in the size
and vintage within given destination communities in order to determine whether those characteris-
tics a®ect migrant employment. His ¯ndings con¯rm that community-based social interactions are
important in matching Mexican migrants and US ¯rms, and appear to improve labor market out-
comes among migrants, with smaller and younger networks substantially reducing the employment
probabilities of Mexican migrants.
Montgomery (1994) models the impact of social interaction on employment transitions and
inequality in a way that links the notion of strong versus weak ties to the social structure. In his
model, social structure consists of a large number of small groups, dyads, groups of two connected
individuals. In each dyad, either both members are employed, only one is employed or both are
unemployed. The relationship between two members of a dyad is a strong tie. Individuals interact
with others at a rate ¿ per unit of time, and such interaction may lead to a match with one's
18dyad partner with probability !; or it may lead to a random match with someone else from the
entire population, with probability 1 ¡ !: In the latter case, because of random matching, the
individual has an in¯nitesimal probability of interacting again with the same person. For this
reason, random matches are construed as weak ties. By varying the probability of interaction with
one's strong tie, one may, in e®ect, model di®erent social settings. Jobs break up randomly at a
rate ±; so that either a strong or weak tie may be employed or unemployed. The job ¯nding rate for
each person depends on the employment status of her contact and on her general ability to collect
information on job openings. Although individuals who make up each dyad do not change over
time, their employment status does change and so does the employment situation in each dyad.9 As
in Montgomery's earlier work, social interactions are characterized by inbreeding bias, whereby the
probability that an unemployed individual's random match contact is employed with probability
less than or equal to the average employment rate in the population. The combination of a rigid
social structure with inbreeding bias in employment status implies that random matching is less
useful to individuals and the employment status of one's dyad partner is critical. Using this model,
Montgomery shows that a higher proportion of weak-tie interactions reduces employment inequality.
It also increases the steady state employment rate, provided that inbreeding by employment status
among weak ties is su±ciently small.
3.3 The Work of Calv¶ o-Armegnol and Jackson
Two recent path-breaking papers, Calv¶ o-Armegnol and Jackson (2002; 2003), explore the implica-
tions of exogenous information networks. Both papers use the following model of the transmission
of job information among workers. A network of contacts among n individuals, the social structure,
is de¯ned by means of an n£n matrix G; of intensities of social attachments: gij > 0; if i is linked
to j; gij = 0; if i is not linked to j: This formulation combines the notion of an adjacency matrix
in graphs with the notion of varying intensities of social contacts and allows for the network to be
directed. That is, if individual i hears of a job opening, she tells individual j if gij > 0: However,
unless gji > 0; individual j will not pass on such information to i: The transmission of job informa-
tion to each worker through the network at the beginning of each period results in new employment.
9Calv¶ o-Armegnol et al. (2004) explore the concept of a dyad in the context of the labor market and, in addition,
introduce criminal activities as an option within a given social structure.
19An unemployed individual who hears of a job opening keeps it to himself. An employed individual
who hears of a job opening passes it on to each of her social contacts with probabilities that are
proportional to the respective relative weights. For example, an individual i's unemployed contact
j will hear from i with probability equal to product of the probability that i hears directly of a job
opening, which is assumed to be a function of all agents' wages in the previous period, times the
relative weight of j's social strength, which is equal to gij divided by the sum of the weights of all
contacts who are unemployed. The weights of social attachment express a continuous counterpart
of Granovetter's notion of strong versus weak ties and thus generalize it.
Calv¶ o-Armegnol and Jackson (2002) assume that the expected number of o®ers that agent i
receives is a non-decreasing function of the wages of that agent's contacts in the previous period
and a non-increasing one in agent i's own wage. These assumptions imply a set of \altruistic"
values about social exchange that in°uences the passing around of job-related information. Calv¶ o-
Armegnol and Jackson determine an agent's wage by assuming that it is a non-decreasing function
of the past wage and of the number of employment opportunities the agent has in hand. This
function allows for substitution among previous wage status and current employment prospects.
Turnover in the job market is ensured by random breakup of jobs. The paper distinguishes the
e®ect of social connectedness (one agent's expected job o®er is sensitive to another agent's past
wage and vice versa), and the passing of job related information between agents.
Using this model, Calv¶ o-Armegnol and Jackson develop explanations for several important
stylized facts about labor markets. First, information passed from employed individuals to their
unemployed acquaintances makes it more likely that their acquaintances will become employed.
This generates positive correlation between employment and wages of networked individuals within
and across periods. Second, duration dependence and persistence in unemployment may be ex-
plained by recognizing that when an individual's direct and indirect social contacts are unemployed,
the likelihood of obtaining information about jobs through contacts is reduced. Such duration de-
pendence is well-documented; see, for example, Devine and Kiefer (1991), Lynch (1989) and van
der Berg and van Ours (1996). Third, the likelihood of dropping out of the labor force is higher for
an individual whose social contacts have poor employment experience. This can lead to substantial
di®erences in drop-out rates across groups. Moreover, small di®erences in initial conditions of dif-
20ferent individuals and in network structure can lead to large di®erences in drop-out rates. Fourth,
higher initial drop-out rates for a set of networked individuals imply that its short-run as well as
its steady state distribution of unemployment and wages will be worse (in the sense of ¯rst-order
stochastic dominance). Contagion e®ects then cause inequality in wages and employment, because
those remaining in the labor force will have fewer direct and indirect acquaintances on the job,
and that in turn will hamper their job information prospects. It is hard to explain such an e®ect
outside of a social network model.
Particularly noteworthy are results that Calv¶ o-Armegnol and Jackson (2002) obtain about the
key role of drop-out rates. To do so they work with a speci¯c case of the model in Calv¶ o-Armegnol
and Jackson (2003). In it, all jobs are identical and they o®er equal wage rates. Only one agent
receives information about a job opening and only if she is unemployed. The paper presents a
number of examples, each with di®erent explicit structures, that help demonstrate the subtle role
of network. For example, if three agents are connected according to a path, the two end agents are
competitors for job information in the short run, but their outcomes are positively correlated in
the long run. That is so because their presence helps the center agent return to employment if she
becomes unemployed. With more complex social network topologies, an agent's likelihood of being
unemployed depends on her position within the network. The average unemployment rate increases
with closed-knittedness, because more extensive social ties make possible greater diversi¯cation of
information sources. Calv¶ o-Armegnol and Jackson are able to prove that, under certain general
conditions, employment status across any arbitrary periods is correlated among all interconnected
agents and that there is duration dependence in unemployment.
These authors explain duration dependence as a social e®ect: the longer an individual is un-
employed the more likely it is that her \social environment is poor," making future unemployment
prospects unfavorable. This explanation for duration dependence complements the more commonly
stated ones, such as unobserved heterogeneity and the like. This e®ect, essentially a network exter-
nality, is also responsible for stickiness in aggregate employment dynamics. The closer the economy
is to very high employment (or unemployment), the harder it is to leave that state. For similar rea-
sons, parts of the economy can experience a boom while simultaneously other parts of the economy
are experiencing a bust.
21Di®erences in initial conditions combine with di®erences in the collective employment histories
and with di®erent network dynamics of two otherwise identical networks to produce sustained
inequality of wages and drop-out rates that feed on each other. So, in the model of the two Calv¶ o-
Armegnol and Jackson papers, history matters and is responsible for producing income inequality
for reasons that are very di®erent from those due to inequalities in human capital investments [
Loury (1981) ], or in access to community-based opportunities [ Durlauf (1996a; 1996b) ]. This
implies that interventions in the labor market, such as providing incentives for individuals not to
drop out, are likely to have long-lasting e®ects.
The design of such interventions should re°ect the topology of the network. It would be more
e®ective to target groups of agents who are highly connected, taking advantage of social attachment
e®ects among agents, instead of targeting the same number of uniformly connected individuals.10
Similarly, institutions that seek to \network" otherwise isolated individuals can potentially bring
about socially desirable outcomes.11 These results depend on essentially altruistic assumptions
about social exchange in the context of social interactions, in ways that are conceptually similar to
spatial interactions as modelled by Schelling (1971; 1978).
3.4 Proximity, Information Sharing and Neighborhood E®ects
Several recent economic studies emphasize network e®ects as neighborhood e®ects: they examine
whether it is appropriate to associate geographic proximity with facilitation of information °ow.
This question is, of course, identical to the question addressed by the empirical literature on the
economics of social interactions. Even if we have compelling evidence of correlations in the behavior
of individuals who are in physical and social proximity to one another, we wish to know what
explains such correlations. That is, we wish to know whether we see correlations among such
individuals because they share the same sources of information (a correlated e®ect), because they
share individual characteristics as a result of self-selection (a contextual, or exogenous social, e®ect),
or because they learn from one another's behavior (an endogenous social e®ect) [ Manski (2000) ].
Topa (2001) ¯nds geographic correlations in patterns of unemployment across neighborhoods
10Unfortunately, the technical problem of ¯nding who are the individuals who should be targeted is computationally
very di±cult in general [ Kempe et al. (2003) ].
11The importance of network e®ects on the drop-out rate is also argued by Heavner and Lochner (2002), though
the results are not as dramatic.
22and cites them as evidence of positive correlation between employment and wages of networked
individuals. He points out that high unemployment rates were concentrated in relatively few areas
of Chicago in 1980 and 1990. Using Census tracts as units of observation, he assumes that residents
of adjacent tracts exchange job information. He ¯nds that high unemployment in one tract is asso-
ciated with more unemployment in neighboring tracts than can be explained by the characteristics
of the neighboring tracts alone. Conley and Topa (2003a) ¯nd that socioeconomic characteristics
(and in particular ethnic and occupational distance) explain a substantial component of the spatial
dependence in unemployment. Using similar data but for the Los Angeles SMSA, Conley and Topa
(2003b) show that local interactions perform well in explaining the spatial correlation patterns
present in the data. In addition, using data on the distribution of individual unemployment spells
in-progress, they show that their model of interactions is consistent with the Calv¶ o-Armegnol and
Jackson (2003) explanation of duration dependence in unemployment discussed above.
A conceptually related study by HedstrÄ om et al. (2003) emphasizes transitions out of unem-
ployment, using the Pissarides model [ Pissarides (2000) ] with data on all 20- to 24-year olds living
in Stockholm during the 1990s. Both of those papers produce evidence for partial identi¯cation of
social interactions in unemployment.
Weinberg, Reagan, and Yankow (2000) provide some evidence of non-monotonic neighborhood
e®ects on labor market outcomes. They link con¯dential street address data from the NLSY79 with
measures of neighborhood social characteristics at the census tract level for 1990 and measures of
job proximity based on the 1987 Censuses of Manufacturing, Retail Trade, and Services. They show
that one standard deviation increase in neighborhood social characteristics and in job proximity
raises individuals' hours worked by 6 percent and 4 percent in the average, respectively. Such social
interactions have nonlinear e®ects. The greatest impact is in the worst neighborhoods. Being in
a disadvantaged neighborhood is more important rather than the labor activity of one's neighbors
per se. Social interaction e®ects are also larger for less educated individuals and for Hispanics, but
not for blacks compared to whites.
While these works are in broad agreement, recent research by Oreopoulos (2003) ¯nds that when
neighborhoods are not selected, neighborhood quality plays little role in determining a youth's even-
tual earnings, likelihood of unemployment, and welfare participation. In contrast, family di®erences,
23as measured by sibling outcome correlations in a relatively homogeneous sample of low-income fam-
ilies living in Toronto public housing, account for up to 30 percent of the total variance in earnings.
These ¯ndings are particularly signi¯cant because the respondents in that study had been adminis-
tratively assigned to di®erent public housing residences and therefore the assignment process should
have removed much of the selection across neighborhood types, according to the author.
The recent study that makes the strongest and most compelling case to date for the e®ects of
geographical proximity on job market outcomes is Bayer et al. (2004). They document that people
who live close to each other, de¯ned as living in the same census block, also tend to work together,
de¯ned as working in the same census block: the baseline probability of working together is 0.93
percent compared to 0.51 percent at the block group level (a collection of ten contiguous blocks).
Their ¯ndings are robust to the introduction of individual controls in the form of a number of socio-
demographic characteristics and block group ¯xed e®ects. More speci¯cally, these authors examine
the hypothesis that agents interact very locally with their social contacts, exchanging information
about jobs. Let: i and j be individuals who reside in the same Census block group but not in the
same household; Wb
ij a dummy variable that is equal to one, if i and j work in the same Census
block; Rb
ij is a dummy variable that is equal to one, if i and j reside in the same Census block; Xij
a vector of socio-demographic characteristics for a matched pair (a concept to be clari¯ed shortly
below) (i;j); and, ½g a residential block group ¯xed e®ect which serves as the baseline probability
of an employment match for individuals living in the same block group. Then their hypothesis may
be examined in terms of a regression:
Wb
ij = ½g + ¯0Xij + (®0 + ®0
1Xij) ¢ Rb
ij + "ij: (1)
These authors' test for the presence of social interactions due to proximity boils down to testing for
the statistical signi¯cance of the term (^ ®0 + ^ ®0
1Xij): They include both the baseline probability ^ ½g
and matched pair's covariates in levels, ^ ¯0Xij; to control for any observed and unobserved factors
that may in°uence employment locational choices at the block group level. For example, this
controls for features of the urban transportation network that might induce clustering in both
residence and work location. Also, worker characteristics might be correlated with both residential
location preferences and work location, if ¯rms sort along the same variables. Their empirical
strategy addresses several additional potential pitfalls, including possible sorting below the block
24level and the possibility of reverse causation. After they estimate the social interactions e®ect they
consider whether the quality of the matches available in an individual's block a®ects employment,
labor force participation, and wage outcomes.
Bayer et al. use data from the 1990 US Census for the Boston metropolitan area data for all
households who responded to the long US Census form, and choose individuals who did not reside
in the same household, were US born and aged between 25 to 59, and employed at the time, thus
ending up with 110,000 observations. From these data, about 4 million observations on matched
pairs were constructed by matching up individuals in pairs, in a city with 2,565 block groups with
an average of 10 blocks each.
Bayer et al. ¯nd that social interactions are stronger when a pair of individuals are more
likely to interact because of education, age and the presence of children12; interactions are stronger
when one of the two individuals is strongly attached to the labor market, and are weaker when
both are drop-outs, young or married females. In terms of the magnitude of the impact of match
quality, a one standard deviation increase in referral opportunities raises labor force participation
by one percentage point, weeks worked by about two thirds of one week, and earnings by about
two percentage points. This study is also signi¯cant for its reliance on di®erent geographical scales
for identi¯cation.
Two other studies, that had in fact preceded Bayer et al., have sought to identify \network
e®ects" by using concepts of proximity similar to those of Bayer et al.. Both seek to establish that
individuals in close proximity share information. Therefore, they are not only methodologically
similar to Bayer et al. but also relevant to those interested in establishing information sharing
among individuals in close proximity to one another. Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000)
consider the impact of social networks on welfare participation. They emphasize methods that allow
them to distinguish between the e®ects of networks from those of unobservable characteristics of
individuals and of the communities in which they live. Like Bayer et al., they attempt to distinguish
between the e®ects of mere geographic proximity and of information transmission made possible
by proximity. In particular, they rely on language spoken and examine whether being surrounded
by others who speak the same language increase welfare use more for individuals who belong to
12Assortative matching of this type in social networks has been documented by Marsden (1987).
25high welfare-using groups. Individuals interact more with others who speak the same language
and are therefore more likely to be in°uenced by other members of that group. They obtain highly
signi¯cant and positive coe±cients on the interaction between contact availability and mean welfare
participation of one's language group and interpret these ¯ndings as evidence of network e®ects.
Aizer and Currie (2002) examine \network e®ects" in the utilization of publicly funded prenatal
care. These authors consider women as belonging to a network if they live in the same neighborhood
(de¯ned as the areas of 5-digit zip code) and belong to the same racial or ethnic group. They use
data on take-up of publicly funded prenatal care, which originate in Vital Statistics from California's
Birth Public Use ¯les from 1989 to 2000. They ¯nd evidence in favor of their hypothesis that
pregnant women are most likely to be in°uenced by new mothers from the same area and ethnic
group in terms of their own use of public prenatal care programs. Such use is highly correlated
within groups de¯ned using race/ethnicity and neighborhoods, and persists even after accounting
for unobserved characteristics by including zip code-year ¯xed e®ects. However, the richness of their
data (which are abstracted from birth certi¯cates and include more than 3.5 million observations)
allows them to test whether such estimated e®ects represent information sharing within groups.
This is accomplished by including ¯xed e®ects for the hospital of delivery interacted with the year
of delivery. The results on the estimated e®ects of \networks" are then either reduced or eliminated
and thus cast doubt on the idea that the observed correlations can be interpreted as evidence of
information sharing. They point instead to di®erences in the behavior of the women involved
and of the institutions serving di®erent groups of low-income women as the primary explanation
for group-level di®erences in the take-up of this important public program. They examine the
role of institutions by comparing the behavior of foreign-born with that of native-born Hispanic
women. They ¯nd that \network e®ects" are quite similar for both those groups of Hispanic
women, in contrast to their expectation that foreign-born women will have greater informational
requirements. They conclude, therefore, that it is di®erences in the behavior of institutions and
not information sharing that explains the established correlations between neighborhood and ethnic
group membership in prenatal care use.
Lalive (2003) also examines social interactions among unemployed individuals. This empirical
study exploits an unusual quasi-experimental setting created by selective extension of unemploy-
26ment bene¯ts by the Austrian government to individuals who resided in certain regions and were
employed (or had been employed) by a certain group of industries. Evidence of social interactions
in unemployment behavior measured in terms of length of unemployment spells takes the form of
both direct e®ects among individuals who are entitled to the extended bene¯ts and indirect e®ects
through the impact of the program's extension on the behavior within the reference group. Their
methodology is interesting because their identi¯cation of social interactions uses a linear model with
the dummy variable indicating that an individual is aged at least 50 years and has continuous work
history as an individual e®ect and with its corresponding group mean as a contextual e®ect. Their
approach is made possible because of the Austrian government's \partial-population intervention."
This route to identi¯cation of social interactions model was discussed by Mo±tt (2001). That
is, the endogenous social interactions coe±cient is disentangled from the direct e®ect of extended
bene¯ts by distinguishing two groups of the population and by comparing reduced forms estimated
with data for those a®ected with estimates for those not a®ected by the policy. This result is also
particularly relevant in explaining spatial variation in unemployment, an issue of great interest in
large economies.
3.5 The Role of Job Referrals
Krauth (2002) focuses on spatial proximity e®ects by studying the consequences of employers' using
their social ties with their employees to make inferences about unobserved components of the pro-
ductivity of their workers' social contacts. He shows that there is a critical value for neighborhood
human capital below which long-run employment at equilibrium is low and above which it is high.
The critical value depends on the strength of social contacts.
Finneran and Kelly (2003) examine theoretically the role of job referrals with special emphasis
in the persistence of inequality. Workers di®er in terms of skills, and such di®erences are ex
ante unobservable by employers. Each individual is a member of a hierarchical referral network.
Employees may refer their own acquaintances they believe to be quali¯ed for employment. If those
are hired, they in turn refer their acquaintances. Each step in the referral process is stochastic
and re°ects a whole host of factors describing the labor market. Their central result is that the
density of referral linkages exhibits threshold behavior. Above a threshold, workers throughout
27the hierarchy are referred for employment with probability one; below it, workers' probability of
referrals falls exponentially as one moves down the network so that average income falls and workers
at very low levels are referred with probability zero. Referrals are more valuable than anonymous
matching because they convey information about employees' quali¯cations, reduce recruiting and
training costs, and lower monitoring costs. Finneran and Kelly establish the value of referrals in a
general network, where the number of potential ties by each worker and the probability of forming
ties all di®er across the network. Given a set of potential direct referrals with a large number of
potential connections n and a set of workers who are always guaranteed employment, the measure
of paths that connect those who are always guaranteed employment with other individuals in a
network who are far away from them (in terms of the number of required referrals) is increasing
in the number of actual referrals made. As the size of the economy grows, there exists a critical
number of linkages, which varies slowly with n; such that the probability for any group of workers
who are far in terms of linkages from those who are always guaranteed employment to be linked
with them through referrals tends to one, when the number is above the critical value, and to zero,
when it is below it. As in the result of Calv¶ o-Armegnol and Jackson, this is due to the statistical
properties of networks composed of workers who are otherwise identical.
Krauth (2003b) models search for jobs, where individuals' social acquaintances provide referrals
to potential employers. The model assumes a social structure, represented by a directed graph,
which is exogenously given but may possibly be time varying, and may vary stochastically as well,
but remains exogenous. Firms hire workers but do not observe their quality directly. A worker's
past employment and social connections a®ect her current employment prospects. Krauth proposes
a model of strong versus weak ties that is intended to express Granovetter's concept of weak versus
strong ties as follows: a social tie from agent i to agent j is de¯ned as strong, if j also has a social tie
to one or more of i's other friends; it is weak, otherwise. The model involves starting from a network
with only strong ties and switching some of the social connections randomly with probability p:
For large networks, the probability that this process will generate another strong tie is close to 0,
and the fraction of weak ties in the resulting network is approximately p: Krauth uses simulations
to show that the long-run probability of employment is increasing with the proportion of weak ties.
Weak ties appear to be a way for an individual to diversify her social resources. When individuals
28are friends of one another (they are connected through strong ties), their employment statuses are
correlated and this increases the variance in the number of employed friends. Therefore, a network
with more weak ties is associated with smaller inequality in the distribution of employed friends
and thus with a higher overall employment rate. Tassier and Menczer (2002) also study the role of
referrals in labor market outcomes.
Empirical evidence on the interaction among individuals and their social contacts and employers
through job referrals is not as extensive. According to Loury (2003), who works with the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, personal contacts have signi¯cant wage e®ects for young men only
when their contacts are older generation male relatives who know the boss or arranged an interview
for the job-seeker. Simon and Warner (1992) presented evidence that those who found out about
their jobs through an acquaintance inside the ¯rm had higher starting salaries, while those who
found out through an acquaintance outside the ¯rm had lower starting salaries. They attributed
this ¯nding to reductions in employer uncertainty about worker productivity.
Economics research has explored the salient aspects of contact and relational heterogeneity
that in°uence job contact prospects for individuals, but there is little comparable work on the
e®ects of employer characteristics. In a notable exception, the varying role of referrals in the U.S.
industrial sector has been studied directly by Kugler (2002). She ¯nds that the observed positive
correlation between industry wage premia and use of employee referrals when industry-level data
are used, disappears when she controls for sector of employment using micro data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth.
Relying on data from the European Community Household Panel, Pellizzari (2003) reports
substantial cross-country variation in the e®ects of contacts on earnings. In some cases, contacts
result in wage premiums and in others workers who found their jobs through contacts earn less than
those using formal sources. The latter largely occur in industries where ¯rms invest substantially
in formal recruitment activities. Firms are more likely to undertake such investments for high
productivity jobs where the cost of turnover are substantial. When large investments are made,
workers found through formal recruitment average higher productivity than those found through
other means.
293.6 Evolutionary Models of Social Structure
Next we discuss brie°y some connections of the neighborhood e®ects literature with the literature
on evolutionary models of social structure. Speci¯cally, this literature studies interactions through
games individuals play with members of a population where a social state is de¯ned as adoption
of a norm or other institutions. First, it is interesting to contrast the notion of weak versus strong
ties with global versus local interaction in evolutionary models of social structure. Groups whose
members are connected with strong ties are typically small and \close-knit." Second, as emphasized
by Dietz (2002), the evolutionary learning literature involves ideas that are conceptually related to
social interactions.
A particularly noteworthy ¯nding in this literature is a result of Ellison (1993), according to
which if individuals interact with members of a large population then existing behavior (or social
conventions, historical forces, etc.) are likely to dominate. On the other hand, if they interact with
a small number of neighbors, then cooperative outcomes and thus coordination is more likely. So,
interactions involving small neighborhoods are more likely to be determined by evolutionary forces.
The results of Ellison have been generalized by Young (1998) as follows.13 When individuals
interact mainly with small groups of neighbors, then \shifts of regime can occur exponentially
faster than in the case of uniform interaction ... . All else being equal, the smaller the size of
the neighborhood groups, and the more close-knit the groups are, the faster the transition time
for the whole population [Young, op. cit., 98{99]. This suggests an important role of close-knit
groups for social learning, which in the context of the literature reviewed here may be interpreted
as that of strong ties. This contrasts with the role that Granovetter has ascribed to weak ties in
the interpersonal °ow of job-related information. Clearly additional research is needed.
13Regimes are described with stochastically stable states. The concept of stochastically stable dynamic equilibrium
[ Young (1993; 1998) ] is particularly appropriate to circumstances where a system is subject to repeated shocks, that
is when the system is shocked repeatedly and before it has a chance to recover, it is shocked again, and again. In
such settings, some states will occur more frequently than other states in the long run.
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If social networks are determined by uncoordinated actions of individuals then several of their fea-
tures are of interest. First, how many others is an individual in contact with to exchange job-related
information? Second, how does this number vary among individuals within the economy, and how
might it depend upon individual characteristics? And, third, what is the topology of the associated
network? That is, is everyone directly connected with everyone else, is there a single individuals
through whom everyone is connected, or is there some other stylized pattern of connections that is
discernible in social networks? We review the existing literature while recognizing that it has not,
to date, succeeded in delivering endogenous outcomes with respects to all these features simultane-
ously. The fast-developing literature on strategic network formation, which seeks to motivate the
creation of social contacts in terms of optimizing behavior by individuals has not, until recently,
emphasized job information networks although, as we see shortly, important progress has been
made. The strategic network formation literature has been eloquently reviewed recently by Dutta
and Jackson (2002), Goyal (2003) and Jackson (2003). So we will touch on it only very brie°y.
4.1 Strategic Models of Network Formation
The principal contributions in this literature, including Jackson and Watts (2002) and Watts (2001),
aim at axiomatic descriptions of network-based concepts. Important such concepts are: e±ciency,
with a network being e±cient if there is no other network that leads to higher payo® for all of
the members; stability, with a network being stable if no individual would bene¯t by severing a
link and no two players would bene¯t by forming a new link; and the notion of a Nash network,
where all members are playing Nash equilibrium. The models in the strategic network formation
literature make links endogenous by means of strategic considerations. That is, maintenance (or
creation) of links between two individuals requires that they both consent to it, whereas severance
can be done unilaterally. The utility each member derives from being a member of a network,
that is from being connected with others who may themselves be connected with others, typically
depends additively upon the number of other agents each agent is connected with, minus the costs
31of maintaining connections. Some authors make an allowance for proximity, by means of a decay
factor that depends on the number of intervening agents. Others, like Bala and Goyal (2000),
discussed in more detail below, distinguish between one- or two-communication. As Brueckner
(2003) and Jackson (2003) demonstrate, these assumptions are quite crucial for the results.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) show the equilibrium network is empty if linkage costs are high; it
is a wheel network (where each agent is connected with two other agents thus forming a wheel, or a
circle) if linkage costs are moderate; and it is a complete network if the linkage costs are low. The
two extreme outcomes are quite intuitive. The wheel outcome is also intuitive when one recognizes
that it is associated with two connections per person, which is the minimal symmetric outcome.
This demonstrates the sensitivity of network topology to parameter values and suggests that in
practice may di®erent topologies may emerge in a given economy for di®erent sets of problems.
The recent resurgence of interest in job information networks has bene¯tted by extending several
of the concepts proposed by this literature. In particular, Calv¶ o-Armegnol (2004) suggests that
conditions that lead to di®erent network topologies, that are obtained endogenously, are important
for the functioning of job information networks. That is, the information °ows associated with two
di®erent chains of contacts of identical length but in di®erent topologies are generally di®erent. We
return to this work in detail further below.
Bala and Goyal (2000) also model endogenous network formation, where each individual derives
utility that is proportional to the number of other agents she is connected with directly and indi-
rectly, net of the costs of maintaining those connections. Unlike Jackson and Wolinsky, op. cit.,
however, theirs involves directed links. They de¯ne one-way communication as your having access
to another person's information. An one-way link does not imply that other person has access to
yours, which would be two-way communication (undirected links). Bala and Goyal show that, with
one-way communication, Nash networks are either minimally connected and form a wheel (each
player forms exactly one link) or empty. In other words, information is either shared with everyone,
or there is no sharing. Bala and Goyal also study the dynamics of link formation by assuming a
naive best-response rule with inertia, that is, an agent may choose, with ¯xed probabilities, either
a myopic pure strategy best-response, or the same action as in the previous period. They show
that irrespective of the number of agents and from any initial starting pattern of interconnections,
32the dynamic process self-organizes, by converging in ¯nite time with probability 1 to the unique
limit network. The limit is the wheel, if the linkage costs are small, or either the wheel or the
empty network, if the linkage costs are large.14 With two-way communication the results are quite
di®erent: Nash networks are either \center-sponsored" stars (where an agent forms the network
by connecting himself with all others, occupies the central position and pays for all links), or the
empty network.
It is interesting that experimental evidence that has been obtained recently provides support for
the Bala and Goyal model. Falk and Kosfeld (2002) report that the prediction based on strict Nash
equilibrium works well in the one-way communication model, with subjects forming the wheel or
the empty network in a majority of cases. In contrast, the predictions based on Nash and on strict
Nash fail for the two-way communication model: the subjects do not form the center-sponsored
star nor the empty network in any of the experiments. The authors attribute their results to the
subjects' sensitivity to fairness considerations, which is a well-known factor a®ecting game outcomes
in experimental settings.
Brueckner (2003) extends the basic assumptions of this literature by endogenizing the proba-
bility of a link and of linking costs. This extension assumes that individuals value only their direct
connections, involves a simple mathematical structure, and derives some properties that would seem
to be relevant outside the con¯nes of those particular models. For example, identical individuals
will spread their e®orts uniformly to create social acquaintances, thus bringing about symmetric
outcomes and ruling out inherently asymmetric network topologies like that of the star. However,
asymmetric outcomes are possible if individuals' social attractiveness di®ers | individuals can have
magnetic personalities | or if individuals have di®erent sets of social acquaintances.
The assumptions these models employ do not make them readily applicable to the study of
exchange of information about jobs. Still, the experimental evidence on network formation and
the sensitive dependence of endogenous network topology on costs relative to bene¯ts suggests
that cultural factors may be important in the determination of real life job information networks.
14These results may be generalized by restricting the information available to agents, that is by assuming only
local information | each agent knows the residual set of all those she is connected with, that is those her neighbors
can access without using links to her | and by allowing observation of successful agents { there is some chance that
she receives information from a \successful" agent, that is a person who observes the largest subset of people in the
economy without assistance from her own links.
33Di®erent individuals may value di®erently the payo®s from being connected with others relative to
the costs of doing so.
4.2 Endogenous Job Information Networks
Social interactions associated with endogenous job information networks may be quite di®erent
from others, such as those inspired by constraint, preference or expectations interactions, to use the
terminology of Manski (2000). The theoretical predictions of Calvo-Armegnol and Jackson (2002;
2003)15 depend on ad hoc assumptions about social exchange: the network of social interactions is
given. By varying network characteristics and parameters, one may explore potential consequences
of primitive behavioral assumptions about individuals' valuations of social interactions, especially
with respect to di®erent types of individuals' propensities to transmit job related information.
What do we know about the formation of the networks used for acquiring and disseminating
job information? Boorman (1975) was the ¯rst to ask formally how social groups accommodate
the transmission of job related information. He presents an analytical model of transmission of
job related information through contacts, where individuals choose how to allocate e®ort over
maintaining strong and weak contacts. Strong contacts are given priority in the transmission of
job related information but require more time than weak ones to maintain. Choices over strong vs.
weak contacts by all members of the society determine a rudimentary social structure.
Let ¹ and ± denote the probability that a person will need a job at a particular point in time, and
that she hears directly of a vacant job, respectively. If S and W denote the number of strong and
weak contacts, respectively, then the probability that a person will get a job through her contacts
may be computed as the one minus the probability that the person will not get a job either from
any of her strong or her weak ties. The latter two probabilities may be obtained from elementary
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15Cahuc and Fontaine (2003) allow for individuals to choose between job matching through social networks and
(costly) individual search methods. Such an extension appears to overturn several standard results. Competitive
search may be over- or under-utilized and multiple equilibria are possible.
16See ibid. and Calv¶ o-Armegnol (2004), Proposition 1, for details. Actually, the latter does not distinguish between
strong and weak ties.
34Maximizing this probability, subject to a time constraint, W + ¸S = T; where ¸ denotes the
extra units of time required to maintain a strong tie, allows us to study whether strong or weak
contacts are more likely to be chosen for di®erent values of the parameters. Boorman's probabilistic
approach has recently been taken up by Calv¶ o-Armegnol (2004), discussed below.
It turns out that if the probability of needing a job is small, ¹ ¿ 1; Boorman's model implies
that the equilibrium where all individuals choose weak ties is stable. The opposite is true when
¹ ¼ 1: These results have an intuitive appeal. The only reason for investing in strong contacts is the
concern that one's weak contacts will be preempted by the demands of their own needy contacts.
As the probability that anyone needs a job decreases this contingency becomes less important.
Boorman's model does not use tradeo®s facing workers searching for jobs, but it does portray the
properties of the communication network in a uniform symmetric setting, where each individual
maintains both strong and weak ties.
Boorman's path-breaking work took a long time to in°uence the economics literature. This
is quite surprising in view of the fact that it is a model of endogenous (job) information network,
where agents choose the number of links, which does not require strategic considerations. Curiously,
the development of strategic models more generally seemed to have provided an impetus for the de-
velopment of non-strategic models, as well. Calv¶ o-Armegnol (2004) develops the ¯rst precise model
of a contact network deliberately aimed at passing job-related information and Calv¶ o-Armegnol
and Zenou (2001) explore its implications for labor market-wide matching. These papers, unlike
Granovetter and Boorman, do not distinguish between strong and weak contacts.17
In Calv¶ o-Armegnol (2004), all workers are initially employed; they may lose their jobs with a
constant probability b; and hear of a new job opportunity with probability a: If a worker hearing of a
job is unemployed she takes it; if she is employed, she passes the information on to her unemployed
direct contacts. A worker is employed and hears of a job with probability ® = a(1 ¡ b); and is
unemployed and does not hear from her contacts about jobs with probability ¯ = b(1 ¡ a): Let g
17The earliest model of word-of-mouth communication that we are aware of is Strand (1983), who is interested
in intra¯rm wage dispersion. The concept of word-of-mouth communication used by Calv¶ o-Armegnol and Zenou
is similar to Ellison and Fudenberg (1995), although the latter stresses the e±ciency of social learning. The latter
paper's ¯nding that social learning is often more e±cient when communication between agents is fairly limited. In a
model of word-of-mouth communication, this is understood as sampling from a given sample of other participants,
with some fraction of players ignoring the information and not changing their decisions and the remainder adopting
the choice that appears to be best based on their own nonoptimal sample. This property of limited communication
is conceptually relevant to the role of weak ties in social networks, as we discussed in subsection 3.6.
35denote a network of contacts, gN the set of all subsets of the set of all individuals of size 2, that




: Given g 2 G; the set of an
individual's direct contacts in g is denoted by Ni(g): The probability that an individual i receives
job information who from one of her direct contacts j; j 2 Ni(g); who is assumed to be informed,
is given by
1¡(1¡b)ni(g)
bni(g) ; where ni(g) = jNi(g)j: (This derivation is, of course, closely related to
Boorman's, op. cit.) Therefore, the probability that i does not actually ¯nd a job thanks to j
is given by q(ni(g)) = 1 ¡ ®
1¡(1¡b)ni(g)
bni(g) ; and the probability that individual i actually gets a job
through her contacts is:




This probability is larger, the greater an individual's set of direct contacts. A larger set of contacts
broadens the information channels available to i, but not the number of direct contacts as such.
This probability decreases the larger is an individual's indirect contacts through any of his direct
contacts, nj(g); j 2 Ni(g): That is, having more indirect contacts increases the competition for
information. This basic relationship determines the return to adding and severing links among
any two individuals. Doing so a®ects the information °ow for those directly a®ected as well as









Calv¶ o-Armegnol (2004) uses this model to examine properties of symmetric equilibrium net-
works, when a link between any two agents, which is undirected and costly to both of them, is
initiated only if it is mutually advantageous. The model also implies tradeo®s associated with the
topologies of the networks of contacts. Networks with the same total number of contacts but di®er-
ent topologies imply di®erent aggregate unemployment rates. It is particularly simple to consider
topologies of regular graphs, where all individuals have the same number of direct contacts, that
is, all nodes have the same degree, º. In that case, the tradeo®s between the number of direct and
indirect contacts on an agent's employment probability implies that it attains a maximum over the
set of di®erent degrees, [1;º]: Where an agent's employment probability increases, it is also the case
the marginal e®ect of increasing the network's degree is negative. While increasing the number of
direct links improves the employment probability, it also does so for everyone, thus also increasing
the number of indirect links, which are detrimental to the likelihood of employment for su±ciently
36high values of the network's degree. In other words, direct contacts are bene¯cial because they
improve an individual's information sources, but contacts that are two-links away are detrimental
because they create competitors for the information possessed by a direct contact. This rivalry is
also the reason why the sign and intensity of the payo® spillovers that agents exert on one another
are very much dependent on the geometry of the network. This is also a reason why more general
analyses are di±cult.
Calv¶ o-Armegnol also considers asymmetric networks. In fact, with the same parameters, both
symmetric and asymmetric networks are possible, but they cannot be \too asymmetric." This model
is the only one to date that has employed successfully a model of strategic network formation to
the job market context. Interestingly, individual payo®s in this model do not, unlike the speci¯c
models in Bala and Goyal, op. cit., contain a component that is linear in the number of other
agents each agent is connected with. This could explain why it is so much more di±cult to study
endogenous network topology in the general case in Calv¶ o-Armegnol's model.
Calv¶ o-Armegnol and Zenou (2001) explore the implications of the model in Calv¶ o-Armegnol
(2004) for aggregate matching properties of an economy. Aggregate matching is increasing and
concave in both the unemployment and vacancy rates. However, hearing through both direct and
indirect contacts implies that the impact of network size is not monotonic. This is so, as we argued
above, because such an increase increases the potential number of unemployed workers who are
connected directly to an employed informed worker.
Speci¯cally, if 1 ¡ u the probability that a worker is employed and s is the number of other
(randomly drawn) workers each worker is in direct contact with (the degree of the symmetric, or
balanced, social network), then each worker meets us unemployed workers and (1 ¡ u)s employed
workers in each period. Under the assumption that information is passed by employed to unem-
ployed workers only and the vacancy rate represents the probability that an unemployed individual
will hear of a job vacancy directly, than the individual probability of ¯nding a job through social
contacts is given by: P(s;u;À) = 1 ¡
³




: The matching function is given by
m(s;u;À) = u[À + (1 ¡ À)P(s;u;À)]:
The properties of the matching function with respect to unemployment and vacancy rates are
the same as in the earlier job matching literature; they di®er only with respect to network degree. In
37this case, the matching function is not only not homogeneous of degree one, as in Pissarides (2000),
but not even monotonic. When the network degree increases, unemployed workers hear about
more vacancies through their social network. At the same time, it is more likely that information
about multiple vacancies will reach the same unemployed worker. It is therefore important to see
whether this non-monotonicity is present in the data, which is an open question empirically, to
the best of our knowledge. The properties of the matching function a®ect the equilibrium level
of unemployment in the economy. Matching is increasing in network size, for sparse networks,
and decreasing for dense ones. These ¯ndings suggest that it is important to research further the
aggregate the properties of di®erent types of social networks with respect to matching.
5 Towards an Integration of Job information Networks and Sort-
ing
The interconnection of individuals through job information networks clearly gives rise to sorting
phenomena in both the economic and social spheres. Sorting, on the other hand, has typically been
investigated by the economists in a life cycle context. This section examines the interplay of those
two forces.
A well-established literature has investigated how the intertemporal evolution of human capital
is a®ected by the human capital of parents, of the ethnic group to which the individual belongs, and
of the individual's neighborhood. The natural relationship between parents and children may a®ect
variables (such as \innate ability") that play an important role in the perpetuation of inequality,
but are not subject to choice. On the other hand, mating does involve choice, and the human
capital of spouses is not independent of one another across the population. Parents' choice of
human capital investment for their children is a®ected by their own human capital.
A prominent example of this literature is Kremer (1997), who studies individuals' schooling as
a function of that of the parents and of the mean schooling in one's neighborhood of upbringing.
He ¯nds strong neighborhood e®ects, that is that mean schooling in the neighborhood of one's
upbringing has a coe±cient that is roughly the same as that of the parents' schooling. This e®ect
is not, however, su±cient to explain a large role for residential sorting in the inequality of earnings
38across the population.18 Borjas (1992) regresses individuals' schooling against schooling of parents
and the average schooling of the ethnic group to which an individual belongs. Borjas, too, ¯nds
strong ethnic e®ects. Borjas (1995) allows, in addition, for a potential link between parental and
ethnic capital, on one hand, and residential segregation, on the other, and again ¯nds a strong ethnic
e®ect. Borjas (1998) ¯nds that, in addition, schooling is a®ected by the presence and skill levels
of other ethnic groups in the neighborhood of one's residence, with lower segregation by ethnicity
associated with more schooling for an individual and for her ethnic group. He also allows for
potentially complex interactions between one's ethnic group and the distribution of socioeconomic
characteristics in one's neighborhood of upbringing and obtains statistically signi¯cant results.
Job information networks can have complex neighborhood e®ects, too. They a®ect di®erent
individuals' access to information about job opportunities and thus have bearing for individuals'
abilities to market their labor services. Such e®ects imply a dependence among individuals' neigh-
borhood of residence, social connections, and status and terms of employment. These e®ects operate
within much shorter time frames than the time span between the in°uence of upbringing and of
parents' characteristics and o®spring human capital. It is thus appropriate to allow for di®erent
time scales.19 By de¯ning labor income as the product of human capital, which represents income
earning capacity measured in e±ciency units, and the appropriate wage rate, which represents its
current market price per e±ciency unit, we may separate intertemporal e®ects, such as the parental
e®ect, the ethnic group e®ect and the neighborhood of upbringing e®ect, from social network ef-
fects on individuals' access to job-related information. The former e®ects operate at life cycle
frequencies, indexed by period t = 0;1;2;:::; while the latter operate at nearer to business cycle
frequencies, indexed by ¿t; which indicates intervals of time within each discrete life cycle period t:
They are much shorter than life cycle frequency and account for employment-related events. These
two sets of e®ects would typically not be independent. The social connections of one's parents are
related to the pattern of social connections within one's ethnic group and may also in°uence one's
18Working with the same data, Ioannides (2002) ¯nds strong nonlinear e®ects, which imply multiple equilibria.
Unfortunately, like Kremer's, Ioannides' results are not causal, in that the endogeneity of neighborhood choice by
parents is not accounted for.
19In modelling physical and engineering processes, one often distinguishes between di®erent time scales. See also,
Young (1998) on the notion of \event" time, which marks numerous distinct events that may be compressed into short
intervals of \real" time. In the absence of di®erent time scales, these considerations would produce a contemporaneous
cross-sectional e®ect. We thank Giulio Zanella for directing our attention to Meade (1976), for a discussion of
transmission of inequality based on a concept of e®ects of social contacts operating in di®erent frequencies.
39own social connections.
The intertemporal evolution of income earning ability, human capital for short, of individual i
who belongs to ethnic group e; hi;e;t; re°ects such intertemporal e®ects as the parental e®ect, which
operates through the natural parental relationship between individuals' i0
e;t¡1 and i00
e;t¡1; the parents
of individual ie;t; assuming for simplicity that both of individual i's parents belong to the same
ethnic group, the ethnic e®ect, he;t; and the neighborhood e®ect, hº(i);e;t¡1; where º(i) indicates
the neighborhood of individual i's upbringing. We may combine Kremer (1997) and Borjas (1992;






which allows the ethnic e®ect and the neighborhood e®ects to interact, he;º(i);t¡1: A complete
description of the intertemporal evolution of income earning ability requires description of the
dynamic evolution of the ethnic e®ect. Borjas and Kremer have both dealt with this issue.
Let Si;e;¿t denote the event that individual i is employed, Si;e;¿t = 1; or unemployed, Si;e;¿t = 0;
at a business cycle point ¿t of her life cycle period t: Following Calvo-Armegnol and Jackson, op.
cit., we normalize wages so that Wi;e;t = 0; if i is unemployed. Wage setting may be expressed
as a function of one's wage in the previous (business cycle) period and of the number of new job
opportunities individual i has as of time ¿t; Oi;e;¿t; Wi;e;t = w(Wi;e;¿t¡1;Oi;e;¿t); where the index
¿t ¡1 is de¯ned within the time scale of business cycle frequencies. We may now write an equation
for the intertemporal evolution of labor income,
Yi;e;t = Hi;e;tWi;e;¿tSi;e;¿t: (5)
We may obtain the full dynamic °avor of Equ. (5) by contemplating the dynamic evolution of
the probability of employment and of the number of new opportunities. For example, recall the
probability of i's getting a job through her contacts according to Calv¶ o-Armegnol (2004), Equ.
(3) above. That theory implies that the employment probability depends on the size of the set of
contacts, ni = jNi;t(gt)j; where gt denotes the graph describing a particular realization of social
networks at time ¿t:
The graph describing individual i's social contacts will not necessarily be regular (all individuals
having the same number of contacts with others) and will evolve over (business cycle) time in a
40way that exhibits dynamic dependence. Therefore, in principle, we can describe the evolution
of the probability of getting a job through one's contacts as a function of the social networks the
individuals have access to. These will emerge as a result of individual incentives that re°ect strategic
considerations associated with network formation. That is, Si;¿t must be derived as a function of
Ni;t(gt):20 We note that the discussion of empirical research earlier in the paper suggests that the
e±ciency wage rate, the set of job opportunities and the employment probability all depend on
one's ethnic group. It is fair to say that the empirical literature suggests strong persistence in
ethnic composition and income distribution of neighborhoods.
The empirical research reviewed above o®ers separate glimpses on the joint distribution. Equ.
(5), along with (4) and a description of the dynamics of human capital by ethnic groups encapsulate
the joint e®ects of human capital and access to job opportunities on the distribution of earned
income while accounting for the fact that those e®ects operate at di®erent time scales. Conceptually,
one may adapt the method pioneered by Loury (1981) and the tools of Futia (1982) to describe
the equilibrium joint distribution of these characteristics as an invariant distribution associated
with the law of motion of income earning ability, ethnic e®ects and neighborhood e®ects and job
information e®ects. It is unlikely that this description can ever be reduced to a single dimension
only. However, it would also be interesting to adapt Loury's essentially deterministic approach to a
stochastic one, incorporating the tools of evolutionary stability employed by Young (1998). Further
theoretical research is likely to allow deeper analysis of the impact of job information networks on
inequality. This entirely new approach is crucial for deeper understanding of the lifetime income
distribution.
There has been a fair amount of success in describing the equilibrium distribution of income,
with an emphasis on the impact of sorting on human capital formation in life cycle frequencies.
Our understanding of the impact of job information networks and their role as a force of inequality
is much less developed. They are potentially be very important, in part because network formation
depends on sorting on individuals' own characteristics. It is interesting to speculate how sorting by
own characteristics in choosing whom to associate with, rather than passively reacting to standard
20In view of Oomes (2003), who shows that if labor can be hired in continuous quantities, the long run distribution
of employment in spatially separated markets is uniform, we conjecture that persistence of non-trivial e®ects of social
networks on job-related outcomes is intimately related to the presence of a labor market participation decision.
41norms of behavior in groups, underlies an independent role of ethnicity as conjectured by Borjas.
Kremer (1997), p. 135, notes \that to the extent that people learn from classmates and co-
workers, sorting by an individual's own academic ability or productivity in schools ar workplaces
may have larger e®ects on inequality than sorting by parental characteristics, since an individual's
future characteristics are presumably more highly correlated with his or her current characteristics
than with parental characteristics." As Kremer also notes, [ibid.], this is the kind of sorting which
most people would regard as egalitarian, presumably because it is based on individuals' free choice
of association,\ but it may be most likely to signi¯cantly `increase inequality' ". The phenomenon of
segregation by skill in ¯rms, that Kremer and Maskin (1996) have analyzed, is particularly relevant
in this context. Firms, are metaphorically speaking neighborhoods. Referrals among individuals
who have been co-workers involves selection through one's own characteristics and is closely related
to the properties of technologies used by ¯rms. It thus provides a route for technology to a®ect
equality of earnings. Further work in this area appears to be particularly fruitful.
Research on the dynamics of inequality to date has emphasized the role of neighborhood e®ects
in either the intergenerational dynamics of human capital or the labor supply decisions separately
from one another. The framework we sketched above suggests that it would be fruitful to look
at both sets of decisions jointly. Overman (2002) is a rare example that allows for both types
of spillovers. That paper uses data on a sample of Australian teenagers to test for neighborhood
e®ects on school dropout rates at two di®erent spatial scales. Overman ¯nds that educational
composition of the larger neighborhood can in°uence the dropout rate, possibly re°ecting the
structure of local labor market demand. He also ¯nds, more surprisingly, that low socioeconomic
status of the immediate neighborhood is associated with lower dropout rate.
6 Suggestions for Future Research
The speci¯c model proposed in the previous section provides an overarching theme that helps
integrate life cycle and business cycle forces into a model of job information networks and sorting.
At the same time, a number of other concrete issues may be addressed directly and may thus
complement the overarching theme. They are brie°y discussed next in this section.
Theoretical issues needing further attention abound. The issue of strong versus weak social
42ties is a natural one. It has already been generalized by the exogenous job information networks
literature. It may be pursued further along the lines of the methods employed by the endogenous
job information networks literature, where recent contributions have not distinguished social tie
strength. Similarly, global versus local interactions among individuals provide a tempting parallel
to strong versus weak ties and therefore deserve additional theoretical attention. The ¯ndings of
this paper point to a need to understand better the informational and social infrastructure of the
modern economy. In this context, a particularly glaring weakness of the theoretical and empirical
literature is almost total lack of research on the role of professional intermediaries (\headhunters")
throughout the job market, in spite of anecdotal evidence of the increasing importance of such
intermediaries, and especially outside its traditional territory of executive search. An economy's
social and informational infrastructure is also important for understanding the role of institutions
in facilitating individuals' access to resources.
We stress the fact that network topologies as equilibrium outcomes are very sensitive to param-
eter values and therefore it is important for a model to express the particular circumstances of the
problem. The strategic network formation literature has examined how the economy self-organizes
under di®erent assumptions about expectations. The exogenous social interactions literature has
explored the dynamics of di®erent topologies. Combining these two approaches deserves further
attention.
Research on the impact of the information technology revolution on the job market is only just
beginning. Freeman (2002) provides evidence that computerization and use of the Internet are
associated with greater hours as well as higher wages. Evidence reported by Kuhn and Skuterud
(2000) suggest increasing use of the Internet for the purpose of job search. We know very little
about the impact of the Web on the economy generally, let alone on recruitment and job search.
Both theoretical and empirical research on ¯rms' recruitment practices also seems likely to
yield big payo®s. This research to date has explored existing models of matching to considerable
advantage. However, the methodology of strategic network formation lends itself equally well to
such a task. Wage premiums and wage penalties associated with ¯nding jobs through personal
contacts are the joint outcome of ¯rms' recruitment e®orts and individuals' job search. We cannot
identify the role of information through social interactions without accounting for both sides of the
43market. This is particularly important if one recognizes the conceptual links between neighborhood
e®ects and network e®ects and the econometric issues they pose when it comes to the identi¯cation
of endogenous versus exogenous e®ects, which we discussed earlier in this paper. Institutional and
cultural di®erences across di®erent countries in how social contacts facilitate job contacts and how
use of intermediaries and formal sources di®er need to be better measured and understood.
An important bene¯t here would be for economists to learn from the multidimensional picture
that the network-based theories of mathematical sociology confer. At the heart of the sociological
literature is the belief that network-based models are indispensable for modelling more than just
trivial social interactions. As White (1995) emphasizes, further theorizing on social networks is
likely to pay o® even within sociology, where in spite of technical achievements in social network
measurements, modelling \network constructs have had little impact so far on the main lines of
sociocultural theorizing ... " [ ibid., p. 1059 ]. White sees an important role for studying social
interactions through interlinking of di®erent individual-based networks associated with social dis-
course. Granovetter (2000) urges sociologists to go beyond merely emphasizing \the embeddedness
of action in social networks" and states that a \focus on the mechanics of networks alone ..." is
insu±cient to \lead us toward the more complex synthesis that we seek in understanding the econ-
omy " [ ibid., p. 23]. In view of this it appears that distinguishing between the motives that prompt
individuals to engage in social networking deserves attention in future research.
7 Conclusions
Most of the initial economics research on informal contacts aggregated together the e®ects of
informal contacts and networks. It has assessed the role of job contacts on outcomes by comparing
outcomes with to outcomes without job contacts. The new strands in theoretical and empirical
economic research examined in this paper build on sociological analyses and point out that contact
e®ects are complex and vary due to individual, contact, relational, and employer heterogeneity.
The new literature identi¯es the speci¯c ways in which the e®ects of informal networks depend on
di®erences among job seekers themselves, on the characteristics of the contacts they use, on the
relationship between the job seekers and their contacts, and on features of the work environments
where individuals are seeking jobs. The research makes clear that these components do not operate
44in a vacuum but instead interact with each other to produce the variation we observe in the use
and e®ects of informal networks. This has been con¯rmed by the new theoretical research that
emphasizes the emergence of social networks from individuals' uncoordinated actions and ¯nds
that the resulting networks are very sensitive to parameter values.
The research reviewed here suggests that heterogeneity in network e®ects is important in a
variety of contexts. It can help account for changes in wage and employment inequality across
time. It clari¯es the mechanism behind correlations in observed outcomes within social groups.
Thus research has already used network analysis to elucidate the origins of previous unexplained
similarities in outcomes by race, ethnicity, and gender. Furthermore, it identi¯es the source of some
neighborhood correlations in labor market outcomes. At the same time, there are a number of
promising areas where research is needed. In particular, the importance of employer characteristics




EDUCATION AND METHODS OF JOB SEARCH21
Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Full All
Did Pub. Priv. Curr. Other Friend Ads Other
Nothing Agency Agency Emplr Emplr Acquai. Activ. Searchers PSID
Unemployed
Sample frequencies 11.5 21.8 9.5 5.7 29.4 15.5 33.5 31.0 5.8 100
Years · 8 17.9 20.5 18.2 24.2 21.0 23.3 16.9 14.4 17.0 16.7
8 < Years<11 41.8 25.2 25.5 30.3 28.7 28.9 27.2 30.6 31.6 17.9
Years = 12 26.9 32.2 25.5 30.3 28.7 27.8 32.3 28.9 30.8 31.0
Years = 12 + nonac. 7.5 18.7 25.5 15.2 17.0 12.2 15.4 17.8 14.6 18.7
13<Years < 15 4.5 9.5 5.5 0.0 3.5 6.7 6.7 5.0 4.3 9.4
BA + adv. 1.5 6.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.1 1.5 3.3 1.7 6.2
Searching on-the-job
Sample frequency 60.5 6.3 3.0 2.0 9.4 8.5 16.0 17.0 8.1 100
Years · 8 7.1 9.8 16.7 6.3 13.2 11.6 13.2 6.6 8.3 16.7
8< Years < 11 17.2 17.7 12.5 12.5 13.2 14.5 11.6 8.0 14.3 17.9
Years = 12 33.7 41.2 25.0 31.3 34.2 29.0 38.0 38.7 34.9 31.0
Years = 12 + nonac. 27.2 25.5 25.0 43.8 22.4 21.7 18.6 22.6 25.3 18.7
13 < Years <15 9.4 3.9 16.7 6.3 15.8 13.0 14.0 18.3 11.9 9.4
BA + adv. 5.3 2.0 4.2 0.0 1.32 10.1 4.7 5.8 5.2 6.2
21The categories are: 1. whether done nothing; 2. searched with a public employment agency; 3. searched with a
private employment agency; 4. checked with the current employer; 5. checked with the other employer; 6. checked
with friend or relative; 7. placed or answered ads; or, 8. engaged in other activity.
The results are summarized in the following table. The entries in the lines labelled \sample frequencies" are not
mutually exclusive { some respondents may be engaged in more than one methods { and thus do not add up to
100. The entries for educational attainments sum up to 100 in each column. The column labelled \Full" gives the
educational attainments for the respective subsample of unemployed and those searching on the job in the 1993
sample of the PSID. The column labelled \All" gives the educational attainments for the entire 1993 sample of the
PSID.
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URBAN SIZE AND METHODS OF JOB SEARCH22
Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Full All
Did Pub. Priv. Curr. Other Friend Ads Other
Nothing Agency Agency Emplr Emplr Acquai. Activ. Searchers PSID
Unemployed
Sample frequencies 11.5 21.8 9.5 5.7 29.4 15.5 33.5 31.0 5.8 100
> 500,000 38.20 27.17 15.60 35.10 13.17 51.11 22.21 23.69 23.86 16.02
[100000, 500000) 12.05 19.73 10.95 3.20 34.59 14.48 19.07 21.66 20.99 24.15
[50000, 100000) 1.69 7.28 15.34 21.16 7.12 8.37 15.61 6.86 9.39 11.76
[25000, 50000) 17.14 7.88 30.43 26.91 7.53 9.87 13.58 16.94 14.36 13.44
[10000, 25000) 3.31 14.57 22.81 5.88 17.94 7.39 20.86 18.36 14.30 15.74
10,000 > 27.62 23.38 4.87 5.21 17.14 8.78 8.11 12.16 15.85 17.38
Employed
Sample frequencies 60.5 6.3 3.0 2.0 9.4 8.5 16.0 17.0 8.1 100
> 500,000 16.19 6.36 7.85 .00 12.28 22.43 14.03 10.17 14.79 16.02
[100000, 500000) 30.77 22.63 22.92 19.27 27.47 22.24 28.45 27.48 30.09 24.15
[50000, 100000) 11.67 13.15 41.89 29.72 25.93 17.68 18.38 18.94 13.43 11.76
[25000, 50000) 12.21 13.29 .00 21.76 12.43 17.49 18.04 10.90 12.90 13.44
[10000, 25000) 13.68 5.98 2.18 1.33 6.73 5.81 10.42 16.27 13.08 15.74
10,000 > 12.10 38.60 25.16 27.93 15.17 14.34 10.68 16.25 13.44 17.38
22The categories are: 1. whether done nothing; 2. searched with a public employment agency; 3. searched with a
private employment agency; 4. checked with the current employer; 5. checked with the other employer; 6. checked
with friend or relative; 7. placed or answered ads; or, 8. engaged in other activity.
The entries in the lines labelled \sample frequency" are not mutually exclusive { some respondents may be engaged
in more than one methods { and thus do not add up to the number in Column \Full". The column labelled \Full"
gives the relative geographical distribution of the two respective categories, unemployed and employed looking for
job, for the entire 1993 sample of the PSID. \All" gives the geographical distribution of the entire 1993 sample of the
PSID. All calculations are weighted by means of the latest weight in PSID.
The geographical categories are de¯ned in terms of the size of the largest city in the county of a household's
residence. The categories are: SMSA with largest city 500,000 or more; SMSA with largest city between 100,000 and
499,000; SMSA with largest city 50,000 to 99,999; non SMSA with largest city 25,000 to 49,999; non SMSA with
largest city 10,000 to 24,999; non SMSA with largest city less than 10,000.
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